

Exercise Evaluation Report

Whakaraoura Tangata

Bay of Plenty SAREX 2023

Location: *Papamoā Beach, Tauranga.
Specifically, the sea and coastlines surrounding Motiti Island and the
Papamoā Beach shoreline*

Date: *2 December 2023*

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Evaluator(s): *Jonathan Westrupp*

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Executive Summary

On 2 December 2023 a functional SAREX was conducted at Papamoa Beach, Bay of Plenty. This SAREX was part of the NZSAR Whakaraoura Tangata series of exercises, which are intended to test to capability of a SAR response to a nationally significant SAR event.

The scenario for this SAREX involved a boutique cruise ship experiencing a collision with a fishing vessel, and the passengers then being required to abandon ship. The SAR response was to search for and rescue these passengers from the sea. The performance of the SAR response to this situation was tested, in particular the reconciliation process.

Volunteers were safely placed in the sea to play the part of passengers to be rescued, along with floating buoys to simulate a mass number of people to be rescued.

The exercise ran from 0900hrs – about 1500hrs on Saturday 2 December 2023 with a multi agency IMT established at Papamoa Surf Lifesaving Club and multiple agencies exercising in the field.

The evaluation of the exercise was centered on the IMT and its ability to manage the field operations of the SAR operation, in particular the reconciliation process.

Recommendations

1. Develop CIMS capability across the SAR partner agencies, in particular the roles and expected outputs of those roles.

This development can be supported by the templates and aids to assist the IMT with their operations. For example printed role cards for functions, large scale pre-formatted whiteboards for your IAP, ICP, Org Chart and enough CIMS vests for a large-scale IMT.

CIMS would be further supported by utilising the GSMEAC briefing format and ensuring your IAP (Incident Action Plan) is central to your briefings. Include a formal objective to 'prepare for the next operational period' to ensure this is tasked.

2. Review the pre-plan for mass rescue events in your region.

Consider additional infrastructure or communications systems for the increased demand and challenges of a mass rescue event.

As part of this pre-plan it is recommended that there be a set reconciliation system that is robust, tested and works in the context of a large-scale, multi-agency incident.

3. Prioritise Risk Management systems in SAR Ops and develop the Safety function.

Ensure written safety plans are included in every written tasking.

4. Develop systems to support situational awareness and planning systems for SAR.

For example ensure that a primary map / chart is designated for your planning and situational awareness. Consolidate your information onto this map to ensure it is your source of truth and refer to it in every briefing.

Comment for Exercise Control

- Ensure EXCON is upscaled for larger SAREXs, especially for functional SAREXs. Create a shadow IMT to ensure EXCON also has good information, is tracking all people in the field (both actors and teams), shadow communications infrastructure and is looking ahead to future forecasts. This will support the overall safety of the SAREX.
- Consider placing mentors with any new or 'green' personnel who are being trialed in CIMS Managers roles or field leadership. This will support their learning and ensure ongoing safety.

Introduction

The event was the NZSAR Whakaraoura Tangata Bay of Plenty functional SAREX 2023 on 2 December 2023.

The exercise was designed to be the functional part of exercising a mass rescue in Bay of Plenty, with a desktop IMTEX already having taken place, and an exercise centered on a Welfare Centre scenario to follow.

The lead agency for the exercise was NZ Police. Other partner agencies involved in the exercise were BOP Regional Council Harbourmaster, Coastguard Eastern Region, Hato Hone St John, Motiti Island Iwi, Surf Life Saving NZ, Tauranga and Whakatane LandSAR, Tauranga AREC and Tauranga City Council Civil Defence.

Background

Background to the Exercise

NZSAR states that “Exercise WHAKARAUORA TANGATA aims to ensure we can respond effectively to a nationally significant search and rescue incident.” Further details on the background of the Nationally Significant Exercise (NSE) are available at <https://nzsar.govt.nz/natsigsarex/exercise-whakarauora-tangata/>.

The BOP NSE (2023 BOP NSE SAREX - WHAKARAUORA TANGATA) is aligned to the current NZSAR NSE WHAKARAUORA TANGATA, centred around the mass rescue exercise of a boutique cruise ship that gets into difficulty with 256 persons on board.

The BOP NSE will be exercised in three parts:

1. Tabletop on 26 July 2023
2. SAR practical on 02 December 2023 (with potential briefing for key players on 01 December)
3. Reconciliation practical at a time to be confirmed in early 2024.

Dates, location, organising agency(s), key people

Functional SAREX, 0900hrs-1400hrs, 2 December 2023

Organising agency: NZ Police, Bay of Plenty District

Participating organisations

NZ Police, BOP Regional Council Harbourmaster, Coastguard Eastern Region, Hato Hone St John, Motiti Island Iwi, Surf Life Saving NZ, Tauranga and Whakatane LandSAR, Tauranga AREC and Tauranga City Council Civil Defence.

Exercise aim

The overall aim of the BOP NSE, as directed by NZSAR, was to ensure they can respond effectively to a nationally significant search and rescue incident; with a focus on the reconciliation element of a mass rescue event.

Exercise objectives

- Objective 1. Develop an effective action plan to manage the OSC and regional response to a Nationally significant SAR incident.
- Objective 2 Coordinate the interagency response to the nationally significant SAR incident in accordance with the Coordinating Authority plan and tasking.
- Objective 3. Establish and manage a robust reconciliation and registration process.
- Objective 4. IMT effectively identifies and mitigates associated risks.
- Objective 5. Establish SAR communication infrastructure.
- Objective 6. Information is effectively managed and communicated during the response to ensure situational awareness across all stakeholders..
- Objective 7. Agencies appropriate to the scenario demonstrate their deployment capabilities for their role in the SAREX.

Exercise Scenario

The scenario was centered around a boutique cruise ship in distress outside Tauranga Harbour, in vicinity of Motiti Island and Papamoa Beach (see Exercise Area below). The simulated ship will be approximately 350-400ft, with approximately 50 crew and passengers (note the reduced number of personnel on board from the tabletop).

The scenario will require coordination across SAR coordinating authorities, SAR agencies and supporting organisations; and will create a significant strain on the local and national resources. Additionally, the scenario will include complexities that create a truly nationally significant incident, requiring national-level coordination and management.

Specifics of the scenario and its timeline will be held in confidence by the exercise planning team to provide participants with the most realistic experience possible, within the constraints of the exercise. Certain scenario specifics will be changed to suit the location of each exercise phase.

Weather conditions will be confirmed closer to the NSE. There will be areas where the weather is considered too rough for IRBs to approach the shoreline, providing opportunity for land-based search teams to search the shoreline.

Evaluation Methodology

The agreed outcomes of the evaluation activity

The objectives and KPIs were set by NZSAR for the evaluator, and are consistent through-out the WHAKARAUORA TANGATA exercises in the 2023-2024 SAREX year.

This report forms the outcome of the evaluation, with copies of the final report to be distributed to BOP Police and NZSAR. BOP Police will distribute the report further within their partner agencies at their discretion.

Each KPI can be:

Met

Partially Met

Not Met

Evaluator comments are included.

Evaluation scope

Included in the evaluation:

- IMT activities on the day of the SAREX with observations of documentation sighted and interactions within the IMT observed.

Excluded from the evaluation:

- Functional activities that took place outside of the IMT that were not observed.
- Activities prior to the commencement of the SAREX, or that took place after the SAREX was ENDEX.

Aspects of the exercise observed, what was not observed

The evaluator remained present throughout the entire exercise within the IMT. The evaluator circulated throughout the IMT making observational notes and taking photographs to document evidence.

The process followed in preparing and submitting the report

A draft copy of this report is to be submitted to NZSAR and BOP Police for review. The evaluator will consider any review comment returned from NZSAR and BOP Police before then sending a final report to these parties.

Other information

Findings

Objective 1. Develop an effective action plan to manage the OSC and regional response to a Nationally significant SAR incident.

An IAP was provided to the IMT from the IMTEX IMT. This was displayed in the IMT as an A3 page on the wall. The IAP was not generally referred to during IMT meetings or briefings. An IAP for the next operational period was not planned for or produced. (Refer Appendix, Figure 4, Figure 5). IAP had a start time of 0500hrs, but no end period. (Refer Appendix, Figure 5). Strengthening references to the IAP and mission in briefings will aid in clarity of purpose for the operational phase.

CIMS functions were assigned. For several people assigned to roles this was their first time in that role. Function Managers wore CIMS vests. A Response Manager was not appointed.

Risk management was not part of the IAP. The safety function was assigned to a person but they were not familiar with the role and not aware of its function or outputs. An operation safety plan was not created.

Relevant support agencies were integrated into the IMT. Although Police lead, other agencies such as Coastguard, LandSAR, Civil Defence were included in the IMT including the planning team.

Objective 2 Coordinate the interagency response to the nationally significant SAR incident in accordance with the Coordinating Authority plan and tasking.

ICP was established at Papamoa Surf Lifesaving base. This was the first time this location had been utilised as an ICP.

A CIMS structure was established for the incident management team utilising the CIMS framework. Although some people were very new to their roles, they referred to online role cards or the Police Checkpoint app to refresh on their role and outputs. Experienced mentors with people unfamiliar with their CIMS role would have helped them learn and perform. Further management support could be provided through:

- An organised master file for the SAR operation
- A prominent Org Chart with all IMT personnel included on it
- Issuing CIMS vests to the entire IMT.

Feedback noted from participants that there were challenges in managing the operation due to learner or 'green' personnel being put into some of the function manager roles.

Support and resource requests were made to EXCON when and where appropriate.

Liaison arrangements with the agencies involved were maintained, along with partners such as iwi. Good collaboration was observed, with all participants working together to plan the response, manage tasked resources and information flow.

The response fulfilled the objectives of the IAP. These objectives were the retrieval of people from the sea, medical treatment, shoreline search and establishment of triage areas.

Formal planning for the next operational phase was not started within the SAREX IMT.

Objective 3. Establish and manage a robust reconciliation and registration process.

The importance of reconciliation was identified; resource was allocated to reconciliation with several IMT members dedicated to the task. There were people from different function groups working together on the reconciliation board, as opposed to this task sitting within one function. Whiteboards were created and developed over the period of the SAREX. (Refer Appendix, Figure 13, 14). A 'Passenger Status Board' whiteboard was created for reconciliation. The detail included on this board was name, location, time, status. (Refer Appendix, Figure 13, 14).

The reconciliation boards in the IMT were well maintained as active boards. They were the single point of truth and were actively maintained. (Refer Appendix, Figure 13, 14). A status category for each recovered person was set on the reconciliation board to track what has occurred with each person. (Refer Appendix, Figure 13, 14).

Triage and welfare for rescued people was prioritised, with a welfare function appointed with a trained welfare person who had good systems in place.

Objective 4. IMT effectively identifies and mitigates associated risks.

Risk management was not part of the IAP. The safety function was assigned to a person but they were not familiar with the role and not aware of its function or outputs. An operation safety plan was not created.

Safety briefings were observed being given to search teams, but were not recorded in the taskings in written form. Coastguard and LandSAR were expected to follow their internal processes for risk management.

A risk management system was not utilised in the IMT. A demobilisation plan would have assisted in ensuring the safe completion of the operation.

Objective 5. Establish SAR communication infrastructure.

A communications plan was well established from the outset, with a written communications plan on display in the IMT and communications briefed to the IMT.

Communications were established in good time from the commencement of the exercise and remained operational for the response period, although were reported as being overloaded at times due the large amount of assets and activity.

Coastguard set up the radio operator in the IMT room, which made communications more challenging than they would have been if in a separate room. (Refer Appendix, Figure 6, Figure 3). Communications were challenging with Surf Life Saving while their IRBs were underway due to the nature of those vessels.

Objective 6. Information is effectively managed and communicated during the response to ensure situational awareness across all stakeholders.

An Intelligence function was appointed. This was a good learning opportunity for the personnel appointed to that function. An Information Collection Plan was created. (Refer Appendix, Figure 12).

The Intelligence worked hard to collect and process information, in what was a busy role in a complex situation.

The use of multiple maps (both paper form and electronic / live) was utilised in the IMT. This included trialing the use of SARTrack across the operation. With multiple maps people can be unsure which map to refer to. Setting and utilising a single map or chart as the central resource, including for briefings, will aid in gaining situational awareness and reduce confusion.

IMT briefings were conducted on a regular basis and were inclusive within the IMT. An increased structure to the briefings would assist in keeping the meetings clear and concise. The GSMEAC format to briefings assists in conveying information in an expected format and reinforcing the mission.

The next operational period was not planned for in this exercise.

Objective 7. Agencies appropriate to the scenario demonstrate their deployment capabilities for their role in the SAREX.

The response was coordinated, with an ICP and Control established. Response was coordinated via formal taskings and a planned response.

Teams deployed quickly under control with formal taskings. Observations indicated that each search resource had the appropriate personnel, equipment and capability to effectively carry out their tasks.

Welfare was managed by operations during the exercise, with regular checks with deployed teams. Coastguard vessels were recalled when conditions became too rough for their taskings, and the exercise was stopped early when conditions deteriorated. Fatigue is likely to have been a primary risk management consideration if a risk management plan had been established by the Safety function in the IMT.

Conclusions

The exercise was well supported by a range of agencies who worked cooperatively and constructively together to fulfil the mission and objectives of the exercise.

The exercise was managed by an IMT established with a good CIMS structure that incorporated personnel from multiple agencies. Experience and capability of IMT personnel varied, and the use of mentors to assist new personnel would help to strengthen their performance. Further support can be provided with function role cards, vests for all personnel, and large pre-formatted whiteboards for IAP, ICP, Org Chart.

The agency field response was prompt and effective, with units able to deploy quickly. It is important that safety briefings are included in taskings and recorded. The IMT needs to develop safety plans for the entire operation, including demobilisation.

Robust communication systems were established early in the exercise. Development of systems and processes for managing communications across different agencies is recommended, especially when using SLSNZ IRBs. Communication systems need to be able to handle large-scale operations and support communication in difficult environments such as open sea.

The scope and scale of an operation of this nature places increased demands and challenges on all responders. Ensure readiness plans take into consideration the additional infrastructure and communication systems required for operations of this scale. These plans need to incorporate a robust and tested reconciliation process.

Appendix 1

Figure 1 & 2- The Papamoa Surf Lifesaving Club. Designated as the ICP for the IMT. The IMT was staged in a ground floor garage area. Coastguard set a radio / comms station at the entrance, with temporary VHF antenna.



Figure 2- Initial IMT briefing by the I/C, 0846hrs.




Figure 6– View out to sea from Papamoa Surf Lifesaving Club showing conditions. 0906hrs.



Figure 7– Marine Chart 'Approaches to Tauranga' NZ 5413 being used in briefing. 1001hrs.



Figure 8– Electronic charts or visual planning utilised in IMT. 1000hrs.




Figure 9– Electronic charts or visual planning utilised in IMT. 1000hrs.




Figure 10– Whiteboard utilized for asset tracking / field teams management. 1001hrs.




Figure 11– LandSAR teams being briefed / tasked prior to deployment for shoreline search of beach. 1022hrs.



Figure 12 – Information Collection Plan. 1232hrs.

NZSAR

INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN

Operation name: OP CALEOONIA Time: 2/12/23
 Prepared by: Simone HEAD Date: 0800

Information Required	Source	Person/Team Assigned	Date/Time Assigned	Notes
Passenger #/details	Port	Simone		
Relocated on Island	Marine office	Simone		
Drift Patterns	RCC	Simone		
Mar Exclusion zone	Harbour Master	Simone		
Environmental Hazards	DOC	Simone		
Passengers located	Police/Marines on island	Cam		
Police jobs reported	Comms	Simone		

Date/Time: _____

Approved: _____

NZSAR

Figure 13– Find locations for missing people now being plotted onto TracPlus screen. 1302hrs.




Figure 14- Reconciliation boards created for missing people. Maintained and kept updated. 1302hrs.



Exercise Area


Overview Exercise Area



IMT and Staging Point



Coastguard Sulphur Point, Staging for Reconciliation, Medical and Welfare (2024)



Appendix 2

Objective 1. Develop an effective action plan to manage the OSC and regional response to a Nationally significant SAR incident.	
Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
Clear Mission and Objectives are set for each operational period	<p>Partially Met. An IAP was provided to the IMT from the IMTEX IMT. This was displayed on in the IMT as an A3 page on the wall. The IAP was not generally referred to during IMT meetings or briefings. An IAP for the next operational period was not planned for or produced. <i>(Refer Appendix, Figure 3)</i></p> <p>Strengthening references to the IAP and mission in briefings will aid in clarity of purpose for the operational phase.</p>
Planning processes and CIMS functions are as established in the IMT.	<p>Partially Met. CIMS functions were assigned. For several people assigned to roles this was their first time in that role. Functions wore CIMS vests. A Response Manager was not appointed.</p>
The action plan is phased in accordance with requirements/taskings from the Coordinating Authority.	<p>Partially Met. IAP had a start time of 0500hrs, but no end period. Objectives were not framed as SMART objectives.</p>
Risk mitigations measures for likely threats and associated consequences are embedded in the action plan.	<p>Not Met. Risk management was not part of the IAP. The safety function was assigned to a person but they were not familiar with the role and not aware of its function or outputs. An operation safety plan was not created. Safety was verbally briefed to tasked teams (LandSAR, Coastguard), but was not recorded in the taskings in written form.</p>
Relevant support agencies are integrated into action planning processes.	<p>Met. Relevant support agencies were integrated into the IMT. Although Police lead, other agencies such as Coastguard, LandSAR, Civil Defence were included in the IMT including the planning team.</p>

Objective 2 Coordinate the interagency response to the nationally significant SAR incident in accordance with the Coordinating Authority plan and tasking.	
Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
Appropriate control structures are established in suitable locations; for example, a forward ICP, a main ICP and IMT	<p>Met. ICP was established at Papamoa Surf Lifesaving base. This was the first time this place had been utilised as an ICP.</p> <p>Although some functions were very new to their roles, they referred to online role cards or the Police Checkpoint app to refresh on their role and outputs. An organised master file for the SAR operation will have strengthened the management of the SAR Op. A prominent Org Chart with all IMT personnel included on it would have supported role clarity and reporting lines, along with adequate vests to set all people with their function.</p> <p>The venue was not ideal due to its size which limited the IMT to how it was set up. (<i>Refer Appendix, Figure 1, 2</i>).</p> <p>Feedback noted from participants that there were challenges in managing the operation due to learner or 'green' personnel being put into function manager roles or roles not standard for their skillset.</p>
Support and/or resources/effect required from other agencies are identified and requested.	Met. Support and resource requests were made to EXCON when and where appropriate. Experienced mentors with people unfamiliar with their CIMS role would have helped them learn and perform. There was a good spread of agency expertise across the functions – the Ops cell had good representation for example.
Liaison arrangements are maintained as required throughout the duration of the response.	Met. Liaison arrangements with the agencies involved were maintained, along with partners such as iwi.
Response is managed in accordance with plans and within mandated frameworks.	Met. The response fulfilled the objectives of the IAP. These objectives were the retrieval of people from the sea, medical treatment, shoreline search and a establishment of triage areas.
The response is managed using a CIMS framework.	Met. A CIMS structure was established for the incident management team utilising the CIMS framework. Issuing CIMS vests to the entire IMT and displaying a prominent org structure diagram would assist with role clarity and reporting lines.
Personnel work in a collaborative manner with colleagues from other agencies.	Met. Good collaboration was observed, with all participants working together to plan the response, manage tasked resources and information flow.
Future requirements beyond the immediate response, together with associated resource/aligned agency are identified and communicated.	Not met. Formal planning for the next operational phase was not started within the SAREX IMT. No demobilization plan was developed.

Objective 3. Establish and manage a robust reconciliation and registration process.	
Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
The information needs for reconciliation are identified.	Met. Resource was allocated to reconciliation with several IMT members dedicated to the task. Whiteboards were created and developed over the period of the SAREX. (Refer Appendix, Figure 14)
Key activities required for effective reconciliation are identified, and clear processes and procedures established.	Partially Met. A 'Passenger Status Board' whiteboard was created for reconciliation. The detail included on this board was name, location, time, status. (Refer Appendix, Figure 14) This function is intended to be exercised in a further exercise phase in 2024.
Appropriate space and logistics support is allocated to enable key activities to be undertaken.	Met. The importance of reconciliation was identified, with extra people resource allocated specifically to this activity within the IMT.
Triage and welfare needs are prioritized.	Triage and welfare prioritised, with a welfare function appointed with a trained welfare person who had good systems in place.
A clear process to hand personnel over to the appropriate agency/organization for onward movement and recovery is established.	Met. A status category for each recovered person was set on the reconciliation board to track what has occurred with each person.
A single point of truth to show reconciliation progress is maintained throughout.	Met. The reconciliation boards in the IMT were established and well maintained as active boards. They were the single point of truth and were actively maintained.
Objective 4. IMT effectively identifies and mitigates associated risks.	
Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
Operational risks, both actual and potential, are identified and analysed.	Not Met. Coastguard and LandSAR were expected to follow their internal processes for risk management. Risk management was not part of the IAP. The safety function was assigned to a person but they were not familiar with the role and not aware of its function or outputs. A operation safety plan was not created. Safety was verbally briefed to tasked teams (LandSAR, Coastguard), but was not recorded in the taskings in written form.
Risk management systems and processes appropriate to the nature and complexity of the situation are defined.	Not Met. A risk management system was not utilised in the IMT. A demobilisation plan would have assisted in ensuring the safe completion of the operation.
Briefing information appropriately addresses identified risks.	Not Met. A written safety management plan was not included in the written taskings. Verbal safety briefings were observed during LandSAR taskings. Safety management was not included in the IMT meetings or briefings.

All participants understand their personal responsibilities regarding risk.	Partially Met. LandSAR team members were observed to understand their responsibilities in safety when asked after a briefing. Verbal safety briefing was included in a Operations tasking briefing given to LandSAR teams. The Safety function was not familiar with their role therefore not sure of their responsibilities. Safety / risk management was not included in IMT briefings or meetings.
Objective 5. Establish SAR communication infrastructure.	
Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
Communication lines between IMT and field teams operate effectively.	Partially Met. A communications plan was well established from the outset, with a written communications plan on display in the IMT and communications briefed to the IMT. Communications were established but reported as being overloaded at times due the amount of assets and activity. Coastguard set up radio operator in the IMT room, which made communications more challenging than they would have been if in a separate room. Communications were challenging with Surf Life Saving while their IRBs were underway due to the nature of those vessels.
Communication systems are operational in a timely manner.	Met. Communications were established in good time from the commencement of the exercise.
Communication systems remain operational throughout the response period.	Met. Communications were remained operational for the response period.
Objective 6. Information is effectively managed and communicated during the response to ensure situational awareness across all stakeholders.	
Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
The intelligence cycle is used to ensure information is subjected to a robust assessment process and decision makers are provided with high quality and credible intelligence.	Partially Met. An Intelligence function was appointed, which was a good learning opportunity for the personnel appointed to that function. However, the Intel had to be told about the Information Collection Plan and where to find it but didn't create one.
All stakeholders are identified and consulted with in a timely manner.	Met. The Intelligence worked hard to collect and process information, in what was a busy role in a complex situation.
Information is shared and relayed appropriately within the IMT and across agencies - briefings are conducted on a regular basis.	Met. The use of maps (both paper form and electronic / live) was utilised in the IMT. This included trialing the use of SARTrack across the operation. Setting a single map or chart as the central planning map will aid in gaining situational awareness. Utilising this map or chart in briefings will aid in quickly providing situation awareness to the team.
Information requirements for next operational period are established and action taken to address these needs.	Not Met. The next operational period was not planned for in this exercise.
There is a clear understanding of a common operating picture across agencies, and this is regularly updated.	Partially Met. IMT briefings were conducted on a regular basis and were inclusive within the IMT. An increased structure to the briefings would assist in keeping the meetings clear and

	concise. The GSMEAC format to briefings assists in conveying information in an expected format and reinforcing the mission.
Appropriate and timely reports are provided within command structures, and to coordinating authorities.	Partially Met. IMT briefings were conducted on a regular basis and were inclusive within the IMT. An increased structure to the briefings would assist in keeping the meetings clear and concise. The GSMEAC format to briefings assists in conveying information in an expected format and reinforcing the mission.
Objective 7. Agencies appropriate to the scenario demonstrate their deployment capabilities for their role in the SAREX.	
Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
Agency response is coordinated.	Met. The response was coordinated, with an ICP and Control established. Response was coordinated via formal taskings and a planned response.
SAR field teams deploy with appropriate resources to undertake expected tasks.	Met. Teams deployed under control with formal taskings. Observations indicated that each search resource had the appropriate personnel, equipment, and capability to effectively carry out their tasks.
SAR field teams deploy in a timely manner.	Met. Teams were able to deploy quickly, with teams in the field and on task in a quick timeframe. Deployment was effective and with haste.
Field teams perform to the standard of their specialty.	Met. Teams performed as expected and were readily deployed by the IMT.
Field teams undertake taskings in line with IAP.	Met. Taskings were given as per the objectives in the IAP and done as planned.
Field teams manage welfare, including fatigue throughout the exercise.	Partially Met. Welfare was managed by operations during the exercise, with regular checks with deployed teams. Coastguard vessels were recalled when conditions became too rough for their taskings, and the exercise was stopped early when conditions deteriorated. Fatigue is likely to have been a primary risk management consideration if a risk management plan had been established by the Safety function in the IMT.