

Exercise Evaluation Report

Exercise Whakarauora Tangata

Phase 2 – Southern District

Location: Invercargill – Southland
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1. Executive Summary

Exercise Whakarauora Tangata Phase 2 – Southern was the second of four exercises held in the Whakarauora series. This was a functional, table-top exercise, delivered using dynamic simulation with multiple injects to control the scenario.

The exercise was run on Thursday 7 December 2023 at Southland CDEM ECC, Invercargill and was designed to test an inter-agency response to the lifesaving aspects of a Category II Mass Rescue Operation (MRO), within a Police District. NZSAR developed and planned the exercise and ran Exercise Control (EXCON). Over 40 people were involved from 17 different agencies.

The scenario for Exercise Whakarauora Tangata Phase 2 centred around a boutique cruise ship foundering at the entrance to Thompson Sound, Fiordland. The simulated ship was approximately 350-400ft, with 256 crew and passengers. A mayday was declared and an evacuation of the ship was ordered.

RCCNZ took the initial MAYDAY call, then escalated the situation to a nationally significant SAR fulfilling the CAT II on-water rescue for the MRO, and the Police tasked with coordinating the land-based rescue and recovery. Functional CIMS team units were established by Police as an Incident Management Team (IMT) at the CDEM ECC and delivered briefings, an Action Plan and Situation Reports over an 8-hour period.

The objectives were designed to test various aspects of the operations including IMT capability, and inter-organisational cooperation, effectiveness and reporting. The general structure and nature of the exercise worked well to test individuals, agencies and broader cross-agency integration.

Participants were highly engaged throughout the day, and the tempo remained high. There were key learnings that predominantly self-identified through the hot debrief and cold debrief process. The IMT had clearly identified good opportunities to learn out of this exercise.

Key recommendations from the exercise include: Ensure the IMT group is delivered briefings that mirror the RCC Cat II led IAP and SITREPS; Create more frequent IMTEX opportunities so the Police, RCCNZ and support agencies can cross train and maintain relationships with support agencies; and Ensure all agencies are integrated within and across the IMT for maximum effect.

The outcome of the emergency exercise scenario was successful in line with the stated objectives and identified KPI's.

2. Recommendations

1. Enhancing Plans, Briefings, and Information

Establish and manage the IMT to maximise situational awareness and alignment to the RCCNZ-led response.

- Ensure the IMT are aware of the areas of responsibility in a Cat II nationally significant SAR, to ensure tasks are allocated in accordance with the Incident Controller's aim and intent, and to test the role and responsibility structure.
- During this exercise a targeted IAP and mission statement was well developed and maintained.
- Ensure visual aids such as broad and detailed maps for geographical context are utilised effectively to assist in creating a common operating picture for all teams/agencies involved.
- Develop a coordinated communications plan to assist in the support agencies' response requirements. Ensure briefings are delivered in a GSMEAC format for efficiency.
- Misinformation was generally interrogated for accuracy, although a couple of 'misses' occurred with subsequently 90 minutes elapsed before planning asked for this information.
- Ensure common operating picture and situation awareness – ensure all are aware of current aim and priorities; read back important information, especially figures and coordinates; close the loop on all interactions (internal and external).

2. Inter-agency Liaison

Create more frequent IMTEX opportunities so the Police, RCCNZ and support agencies can cross train and maintain relationships with support agencies.

- In this exercise, Cross agency authority-powers' understanding could have been enhanced for Customs and Police (for example customs exclusion zones).
- IMT achieved effective liaison with RCCNZ early and was provided with a comprehensive briefing, IAP and SITREP.
- Need to socialise what PNHQ's capabilities are for input, including the potential activation/coordination of DVI.
- No NZDF LO or FENZ LO initially at RCCNZ.
- As occurred in this exercise, ensure escalation occurs where appropriate beyond the IMT for media, embassies, PNHQ, RCC, MFAT, and wider resourcing of Police, St John, FENZ, etc.

3. Integration within IMT

Ensure all agencies are integrated within and across the IMT for maximum effect.

- Some agencies could have been of great benefit within the IMT early in the current exercise for passenger/crew reconciliation and support – Customs, MFAT and the Shipping Agent.
- Southland has a Mass casualty rescue plan – which should have been incorporated into the broad plan and IMT functions.
- Intelligence should be used for verifying information, not just reconciliation of passengers.
- RCC has operating systems that could help solve some of the IMT/communications friction, especially with Health and patients.

- IMT should not be concerned with the precise details of how the rescue is occurring - stick to 'swim lanes' (assets, welfare, helicopters, boats, airfields, etc) and don't try and manage as a SAR that RCC is managing and making decisions at a high level for.
- Shift handover briefings should highlight future agency and resource needs. 24-48 hour forward planning should be occurring. This will help inform NSS resource requirements should the SAROP extend or become more complex.

3. Introduction

The Southern District has been identified as an area of concern for a large and/or complex water-based emergency event. Whilst there are a range of assets available across Southland for a water-based rescue, the coastal environment is remote and is a large area. Coordinating all the key agencies to ensure a focused and effective response to an emergency requires practice through exercising.

Exercise Whakarauora Tangata Phase 2 was conducted in the Southland Police District and was Phase 2 of a four phase exercise series focused on a water-based scenario and response.

The exercise was played out in real-time and allowed for a range of issues to be practiced by participants. Role-players were used during the exercise to simulate non-playing agencies, and there were over 70 'injects' providing challenges to the IMT that replicated realistic situations. Specifics of the scenario and its timeline were held in confidence by the exercise planning team in order to allow participants to enjoy the most realistic experience possible, within the constraints of the exercise. Scenario injects were provided to players to simulate real-life information and their actions to this information.

The primary geographic focus of the scenario was the marine approach/entry to Thompson Sound, and the wider Fiordland area of Southland. The scenario centred around a boutique cruise ship foundering and sinking on approach in Thompson Sound. The simulated ship of approximately 350-400ft, with approximately 256 crew and passengers.

The situation required coordination across SAR coordinating authorities, SAR agencies and supporting organisations; and created a significant strain on the local and national resources. Additionally, the scenario included complexities that create a truly nationally significant incident, requiring national-level coordination and management.

4. Background to the Exercise

The intention was to conduct an operational-level functional exercise of the Police-led integrated IMT in order to ensure a CAT II SAROP was identified, responded to effectively, and multiple agencies working together for a common mission.

All agencies, participants, observers and Exercise Control (Excon) staff of Exercise Whakarauora Tangata assembled at the EM Southland ECC in Invercargill where the IMT was established in a large operating space, with Exercise Control (Ex-con) staged in a separate space nearby. This was a combined functional and desktop exercise. Players were expected to follow their plans and procedures as they would in a real situation, except where informed otherwise.

The exercise was played in real-time, and players were expected to follow their plans and procedures as they would in a real situation, except where informed otherwise. The scenario allowed for a range of issues to be practiced by participants.

4.1 Dates, Location, Organising Agency(s)

The emergency exercise was run on Thursday 7 December 2023 at Emergency Management Southland ECC, Cnr North Rd & Price Street, Waikiwi, Invercargill. NZSAR developed and planned the exercise and ran EXCON. Over 40 people were involved from 17 different agencies.

4.2 Participating Organisations

NZ Police, Southern District
Harbour Master
Fire and Emergency New Zealand
Hato Hone St John
Te Whata Ora (Health)
New Zealand Customs Service
Emergency Management Southland
RCCNZ

Support Agencies: Civil Defence, LandSAR, Red Cross, Shipping Agent, MFAT, Maritime NZ
Observing agencies: Ministry of Justice/Coroners (x3), TAIC, CDEM Canterbury

4.3 Exercise Aim

The purpose of this exercise was to rehearse skills, processes and procedures for the district level Incident Management Team, and to test the efficacy of existing or new plans.

4.4 Exercise Objectives

The overarching objectives for this exercise were:

1. Validate notification/activation procedures of IMT in the context of a SAR incident
2. Clarify roles and responsibilities within and across agencies
3. Practice command and control frameworks
4. Evaluate current and developing plans to identify deficiencies
5. Evaluate capacity to meet SAR/NSS obligations
6. Practice and evaluate reconciliation processes

4.5 Exercise Scenario

At 0725, RCCNZ received a PANPAN (non-emergency alert) notification for the SILVER PACIFIC 2, a boutique cruise ship (approximately 350-400ft) as it experiences a loss of steering entering Thompson Sound. This leads to a hull scrape at 0730, which progresses to a MAYDAY (personnel in grave/imminent danger) at 0747 when the decision is made to abandon ship. This MAYDAY message was then relayed to the Police via RCCNZ.

The 256 passengers and crew abandoned ship in the following vessels: 1x lifeboat, 4x liferafts, 4x zodiacs. Vessels and personnel in the water were heading to Deas Cove, with one raft of 25 persons landing further up the Sound with eight people heading inland looking for phone signal and 12 people staying with the raft. There were 4 overboard and 4 others unaccounted for in the scenario. 3 surface vessels were available to assist (some with paying tourists already onboard), with a Casualty Clearing Point needing to be established at Manapouri Airport. There were ten EMS helicopters available in the scenario.

This was a Category II SAROP, led by RCCNZ with Police tasked as On-Scene Coordinator at Deep Cove and Pearl Harbour managing the land-based response and recovery effort.

The situation presented required coordination across SAR coordinating authorities, SAR agencies and supporting organisations; and created a significant strain on the local and national resources. Additionally, the scenario included complexities that created a truly nationally-significant Category-2 incident, requiring national-level coordination and management.

4.6 Exercise Scope

This exercise focused on the following components:

Police-led Integrated IMT support to a nationally significant Category II SAR, including:

- Escalation and establishment of Police-led Integrated IMT;
- Activation, integration and liaison with supporting agencies (e.g. CDEM, St John, FENZ, MFAT, Customs, health-sector, etc)
- IMT support of local SAR coordination; and
- IMT coordination of reconciliation management and welfare activities.

5. Evaluation Methodology

5.1 The agreed outcomes of the evaluation activity

- Carry out observation of the IMT and its function in an emergency exercise scenario.
- Observe actions to develop and enhance functional team methodology within the ECC environment and to practice and refine plan development.
- To ensure value is delivered for all personnel involved.
- A report to be written outlining observations of the SAREX in relation to the stated objectives and the KPIs.
Recommendations to be made based on those observations.

5.2 Evaluation scope

The evaluation scope was primarily focused on the Police District IMT support to a nationally significant Category II SAROP. This included evaluating:

- Activation of local area Police SAR;
- Escalation and set up of district IMT;
- IMT support and coordination of local SAR and supplementary activities; and
- Management of reconciliation and welfare support, including:
 - Activation of CDEM in support of Police SAR response;
 - Set up and management of local Welfare centre;
 - Triage and supporting reconciliation of rescued people.

5.3 Aspects of the exercise observed, what was not observed

All aspects of the IMT exercise were observed. The evaluator did not evaluate Ex-con operating in a separate space.

The evaluator was present from the time the exercise commenced till the time it ended and had access to every area appropriate – particularly all briefings and SITREP handover - with a high level of cooperation and consultation around the evaluation.

The Hot Debrief was also attended immediately after the exercise, along with a Cold Debrief occurring the following morning.

Evidence was collected via observations, discussions, photos and notes taken at the time.

5.4 The process followed in preparing and submitting the report

Once the notes, photographs and documents were all collated the evaluator report was completed in draft format and submitted for comments. This was then finalised and submitted.

5.5 Other information

N/A

6. Findings

Comments made in this section are observations made based on the six major objectives, and in relation to the KPI's.

6.1 Validate notification/activation procedures of IMT in the context of a SAR incident

- Cat II operation confirmed with RCCNZ via a detailed briefing, SITREP and IAP. RCCNZ advises they are coordinating the water-based search and rescue part of the operation, with Police as OSC (and managing the land response and recovery effort).
- Incident identified as a nationally significant SAR early stage and escalated accordingly. Responded appropriately to early-stage notification.
- IMT was activated quickly and in place at the CDEM ECC by 0800, which helped deliver an IAP with incident commanders (IC) intent.
- Early clarity of RCC's actions (initial SITREP, IAP and regular updates) enabled a targeted IMT IAP to be developed and maintained.
- Misinformation was generally interrogated for accuracy, although a couple of 'misses' occurred including a timing of 3 minutes recorded which was actually 30 minutes, and RCCNZ advising 3 vessels potentially available to respond – however this was not communicated within the IMT, and subsequently 90 minutes elapsed before planning asked for this information.
- IAP and mission identified and displayed in line with RCC's initial request (initially the mission stated in the IC briefing was not what was written on the whiteboard however this was rectified in a subsequent update).
- Support agency engagement occurred early in the exercise and support agencies were generally well coordinated. Some agencies could have been of more benefit at certain stages of the exercise for passenger/crew reconciliation and support – e.g. NZ Customs, MFAT.

6.2 Clarify roles and responsibilities within and across agencies

- IMT achieved effective liaison with RCCNZ early and was provided with a comprehensive briefing, IAP and SITREP.
- Recording the initial briefing with RCC would have been beneficial as there was a large amount of information provided which helped guide roles and responsibilities.
- Verbal communications and liaison were effective and appropriate to CIMS procedures.
- Cross agency authority-powers understanding could have been enhanced for Customs and Police.
- Health and St John coordinated with RCCNZ and Airdesk. A Common operating system would obviously assist this.
- RCCNZ's plan needs to be displayed visually so all IMT functions can reference and refer to this in order to enhance situation awareness.
- Roles and responsibilities were established early in the Incident Management Team (IMT) with representatives from all key agencies present.
- Scenario, process, and regular update briefings were held to help guide all functions.
- At the initial 0820 briefing, it was good to see roles laid out with task elements.
- More detailed operational logs would have been ideal and calling in support/admin personnel for this function early would have benefited this exercise.
- IMT should not be concerned with the precise details of how the rescue is occurring - SAR should be making recommendations but not decisions at a high level.

6.3 Practice command and control frameworks

- Command and control was well exercised, with the IC and Response Manager keeping briefings regular and low key (cascade effect of calmness). The briefings were led by the IC with detailed overview and coordination by the Response Manager.
- The IAP was thorough and updated during the exercise.
- The initial IC briefing was quite long and could have been tighter – although a vast amount of information had to be conveyed. Using GSMEAC may have assisted in summarising the briefings more effectively.
- Integration of support agencies within the main IMT group would have enhanced communication – it was mostly Police led and staffed at the main table.
- Interagency coordination and communications was very good and well run.
- The IC specifically asked district commander for removal of BAU responsibilities and delegate as required to allow focus on the operation. The IC also requested DVI support and integration.
- Chief of staff (Response Manager) role (to IC) was critical to assist the IC have the headspace to enact his plan.
- There was a good operating space which allowed for a highly collaborative environment, although the room could have been arranged more effectively to integrate support groups.
- Safety function needs to ensure all field personnel and logged in/out to keep track in such a remote/complex operation.
- Starting the exercise after the CAT 2/MRO decision was already made works well.
- Police could have asked Customs to declare Manapouri Airport as a Customs exclusion zone. Police need to understand Customs capability and powers of authority in such a situation.

6.4 Evaluate current and developing plans to identify deficiencies

- Early clarity of RCCNZ's actions (initial Sitrep, IAP and regular updates) enabled a targeted IMT IAP to be developed and maintained.
- Using maps early in the briefing would have been of benefit to gain geographic context.
- RCCNZ IAP was comprehensive with resources, contacts, planning, etc. This should have been projected onto the wall and left throughout the operation to aid situational awareness.
- Ensure common operating picture and situation awareness – ensure all are aware of current aim and priorities; read back important information, especially figures and coordinates; close the loop on all interactions (internal and external).
- Maintain records so that if anything happens to you, someone else could step in seamlessly.
- All contributors to the SITREP should state whether they can meet the command aim; what they have achieved since the previous SITREP, what they are doing until the next SITREP, what additional resources/support they require to achieve the aim.
- Record all Teams meetings so incoming teams can gain situation awareness before arriving to assist in expediting integration.
- The RCCNZ IAP needs to be sent to 3-4 people (liaison officers) who monitor communications and channels, so they can disseminate key info.
- SITREPS and IAP need to be delivered in a digestible format.
- Develop a plan to coordinate all documentation and requirements – especially T+48hrs.

- The Planning function is critical to the development of the operation however was at times overwhelmed with tasks.
- Reconciliation numbers were aligned with Excon at the end of the exercise.

6.5 Evaluate capacity to meet SAR/NSS obligations

- RCC is the lead agency in a Cat II rescue, with Police as support. Roles and responsibilities were established early in the IMT and this structure was well maintained.
- Roles were generally well delineated. 'Sticking to lanes' was reinforced at various times. NEMA CIMS cards can always assist with this at the start of an exercise or operation.
- Shift handover briefing highlighted future agency and resource needs. 24-48 hour forward planning was occurring.
- Stick to 'swim lanes' (helicopters, boats, airfields, etc) and don't try and manage as a SAR that RCCNZ is managing.
- Need to understand the powers of partners – e.g. Customs power to create a customs exclusion zone.
- Need to socialise what PNHQ's capabilities are for input.
- Escalation occurred beyond the IMT for media, embassies, PNHQ, RCC, MFAT, and wider resourcing of Police, St John, FENZ, etc.
- Southland has a Mass casualty rescue plan – should have incorporated that into the functions.
- RCCNZ has operating systems that could help solve some of the IMT/communications friction, especially with Health/patients etc.
- A coordinated comms plan would have aided the support agencies' response requirements. Most agencies identified and advised early.
- No NZDF LO or FENZ LO initially at RCCNZ.
- RCCNZ tasked air assets and appeared to have enough to meet the requirements of the exercise.
- Critical to identify a plan for key timings – initial briefing, IAP, status reports, sitrep, mass rescue/evac plan, shift handover. This will help inform NSS resource requirements should the SAROP extend or become more complex.

6.6 Practice and evaluate reconciliation processes

- There was no common operating platform that all agencies could access.
- Investigative team and Intelligence function were actively verifying information for accuracy.
- Health and Welfare could have had more accurate information on passenger status/movements.
- Some agencies could have been of great benefit early in the exercise for passenger/crew reconciliation and support. – Customs, MFAT, and the cruise ship company.
- Good management of welfare support was observed.
- Activation of CDEM in support of Police SAR response included a focused welfare control centre, a triage Casualty Clearing Point (CCP), and supporting reconciliation process for rescued people.

- Regarding reconciliation, think about the “what next and what if” – be proactive, not reactive (e.g. how to account for personnel arriving in different locations, ‘heads up’ to St John and hospital for patients, considering DVI and mortuary capacity and preparations – consider placing National DVI team on standby).
- Forecast need and resources for reconciliation, temporary mortuary, behaviour issues with passengers/patients, medical events/accidents, welfare, handovers, additional resources, safety, catering.
- Identify priorities at the shift handover briefing (SITREP) – e.g. ‘priority is 52 people outstanding’, “what don’t we know?”
- Well sourced information from the shipping agent and from the ship itself. Health and Customs information disseminated quickly.
- The Intell team were actively verifying. Health could have had more info on passenger status/movements. Health and Customs were vital to reconciliation success.
- Custom’s ‘passenger targeting system’ should have been enacted across the manifest, which would have involved a different approach with certain passengers.
- Picture database of passengers (at say Deep Cove) would have been a beneficial action to expedite processing. Can then marry up with biometric information from earlier in the day.
- Consider where any deceased would go and how they would need to be processed.
- Reconciliation numbers were aligned with Excon at Endex.

7. Conclusions

Formulating a clear mission and IAP early and disseminating amongst and across the IMT helped guide and control the entire operation. The IMT can improve their understanding and effectiveness by liaising more with other support agency teams to appreciate their respective powers and authorities that may be useful for the entire operation.

RCCNZ's IAP should be displayed visually within the IMT after it is delivered to enhance situational awareness and to ensure information accuracy is maintained. Recording these detailed briefings would also aid in clarification of information post the briefing call. The use of maps in the early briefings may have also assisted in creating broader situation awareness for all teams and agencies involved. Escalating tasks or requests beyond the IMT helped keep the team focused. Ensure extra administrative/support staff are drawn in early to support the wider recording, logging and reconciliation processes.

Reminding the IMT of the areas of responsibility in a Cat II nationally-significant SAR will ensure tasks are allocated in accordance with the IC's aim and intent.

The general structure and nature of the exercise worked well to test individuals, agencies and broader cross-agency integration.

Participants were highly engaged throughout the day, and the tempo remained high, even though at times it may have appeared relaxed. There were key learnings that predominantly self-identified through the hot debrief and cold debrief process.

The outcome of the emergency exercise scenario was successful in line with the stated objectives and KPI's.

Appendices

Appendix A - Key Performance Indicators (KPI's)

This appendix lists the objectives and sub-objectives and key performance indicators being used for evaluation of the exercise.

Practise unified control, across all levels, during a coordinated inter-agency response to a nationally significant SAR incident. Assess or identify areas of particular risk or opportunity for the SAR sector in the coordinated response to a NATSIG SAROP.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
NO 1.0 - Lead a coordinated interagency response to a significant incident or emerging threat that warrants a NSS activation.	CO 1.1 – Identify nationally significant incident or emerging threat.	KPI 1.1.1 Incident is identified as a nationally significant SAR incident requiring activation of the appropriate corresponding plan and/or agencies.	Identified early and escalated accordingly. Responded appropriately to early stage notification.
		KPI 1.1.2 Lead Coordinating Authority for the response to the nationally significant SAR incident is identified, and communicated to all support agencies.	Cat II operation confirmed by RCCNZ to Police as OSC. RCC coordinating the water-based search and rescue part of the operation.
	CO 1.2 - Implement appropriate escalation measures that activate relevant elements of the NSS.	KPI 1.2.1 Appropriate reports are made to alert higher level HQ.	Implemented via the ECC. District Cmdr notified early. RCC advises PNHQ.
		KPI 1.2.3 Key stakeholders are identified and informed of the activation(s).	Multiple agencies involved. Customs an integral part of the operation. Shipping agent contacted in first few hours.
	CO 1.3 - Develop an effective action plan to manage the response to a Nationally significant SAR incident.	KPI 1.3.1 Planning processes are as established in standard operating procedures and CIMS.	RCC provided a SITREP and IAP in initial briefing. This assisted IC in developing a clear IMT mission and plan. Regular SITREP briefings occurred throughout the ex.
		KPI 1.3.2 The action plan is phased in accordance with the Nationally Significant SAR plan/policy/framework.	Mass Rescue Operations (MRO) Response Plan should have been referenced. Objectives once developed, were phased to the National Significant SAR framework.
		KPI 1.3.3 Likely threats and associated consequences and risks are embedded in the action plan.	Safety function needs to ensure all field personnel are logged in/out to keep track in such a remote/complex operation.
		KPI 1.3.4 Relevant support agencies are integrated	IMT function roles were filled by Police, with support

		into action planning processes.	agencies consulted regarding planning processes. These agencies could have been more fully integrated.
CO 1.4 - Coordinate the interagency response to the nationally significant SAR incident in accordance with the agency emergency plans, the action plan, CIMS, and legal/policy frameworks.	KPI 1.4.1 Liaison arrangements are maintained as required throughout the duration of the response.	Key agencies such as Police and Customs should be aware of respective powers and authorities – such as Customs exclusion zones.	
	KPI 1.4.2 Response is managed in accordance with plans and within mandated frameworks.	Response was well managed in accordance with the IAP and taskings. Reference to the MRO District plan may have assisted.	
	KPI 1.4.3 The systems, processes and resources are appropriate for implementing the action plan, or adjusted to meet the needs of the situation.	Appropriate and dynamically adjusted as required throughout the exercise.	
	KPI 1.4.4 IMT delegates tasks to support agencies within legal frameworks and in accordance with RCCNZ requirements.	Good delegation to Health, FENZ, St John and Civil Defence; media queries referred to Maritime/PNHQ..	
CO 1.5 – Identify and communicate additional support and/or resources.	KPI 1.5.1 Support and/or resources required from other agencies are identified and needs communicated effectively.	Integration of support agencies within the wider IMT physical space would have enhanced communication.	
CO 1.6 – Specialist functional groups are activated in support of the response.	KPI 1.6.1 Relevant specialist groups are identified and activated in accordance with standard operating procedures.	Identified and activated. The hospitals were engaged relatively early for logistics. Ships agent was useful for manifest and ship details.	
	KPI 1.6.2 Information is shared and utilised across agencies to assist in relationship and resilience building.	Whilst no common platform for sharing exists, MS Teams and emails were sufficient in this instance.	
Assess the effectiveness and suitability of existing SAR frameworks, memoranda of understanding, plans, procedures, systems, and processes. Increase knowledge and understanding of roles and responsibilities within and across SAR agencies and support agencies.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
NO 2.0 - Support a coordinated interagency response to	CO 2.1 – Coordinate the support of a significant incident or emerging threat	KPI 2.1.1 Support agencies are coordinated in the identification of a nationally significant SAR incident requiring activation of the appropriate corresponding plans.	Occurred early in the exercise, support agencies generally well coordinated. Some agencies could have been of great benefit early – Customs, MFAT, shipping agent.
		KPI 2.1.2 Support agency requirements for the	A coordinated comms plan would have aided this. Most

a significant incident or emerging threat that warrants a NSS activation.		response to a nationally significant SAR incident are identified, and communicated to all agencies.	agencies identified and advised early. Health and Customs were vital to reconciliation success.
		KPI 2.1.3 Threats and associated risks identified by the support agencies are embedded in the action plan.	Safety function needs to ensure all field personnel are logged in/out to keep track in such a remote/complex operation.
		KPI 2.1.4 Support agencies develop action plans to detail the tasks assigned to them by the Lead Coordinating Authority or IMT.	Each agency had appropriate individual plans to manage their action tasks.
		KPI 2.1.5 Where appropriate, systems, processes, legal and policy frameworks are used to support the action plan.	Appropriate and dynamically adjusted as required throughout the exercise.
		KPI 2.1.6 As appropriate, site, local, regional and national levels of support requirements are identified and implemented.	This aspect worked well, and escalation occurred for media, embassies, PNHQ, RCC, MFAT, and wider resourcing of Police, St John, FENZ, etc.
	CO 2.2 - Coordinate the development of an action plan in accordance with standard operating procedures	KPI 2.2.1 Support agencies contribute to the planning processes as established in standard operating procedures and CIMS.	Feedback from both debriefs noted the excellent manner with which teams collaborated to achieve the shared aim. Interoperability was noted as good, however time spent across agencies beyond exercises will further enhance collaborative relationships.
	KPI 2.2.2 Threats and associated risks identified by the support agencies are embedded in the action plan.	Safety function needs to ensure all field personnel and logged in/out to keep track in such a remote/complex operation.	
Test new or developing concepts, plans, procedures, tools, and equipment. Assess or identify areas of particular risk or opportunity for the SAR sector in the coordinated response to a NATSIG SAROP.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
NO 3.0 - Enable high level all-of-government decision making through the National	CO 3.1 Agencies fulfil their roles as expected in the National Security System response governance structures	KPI 3.1.1 Appropriate agencies are identified and contribute to the response in accordance with their mandated roles and responsibilities.	RCC lead agency in Cat II rescue, with Police as support. Roles and responsibilities were established early in the IMT.
		KPI 3.1.2. There is a clear delineation in roles and responsibilities and appropriate tasking across agencies.	Generally well delineated. 'Sticking to lanes' was reinforced at various times. NEMA CIMS cards can always assist with this at the start of an exercise or operation.
		KPI 3.1.3. Future requirements beyond the	Shift handover briefing highlighted future agency and

Security System.		immediate response, together with associated resource/aligned agency are identified and communicated	resource needs. 24-48 hour forward planning was occurring.
	CO 3.2 High quality information is used in decision-making	KPI 3.2.1 Information provided to decision-makers is of high quality and credible.	Early clarity of RCC's actions (initial SITREP, IAP and regular updates) enabled a targeted IMT IAP to be developed and maintained.
		KPI 3.2.2 Information provided to decision-makers is subjected to a robust assessment process.	Any misinformation was interrogated for accuracy. Investigative team was thorough in this process.
	CO 3.3 Key stakeholders are consulted in the decision-making process	KPI 3.3.1 All stakeholders are identified and consulted with in a timely manner	Generally good. Understanding of RCC plan early kept IMT to task for land-based support – getting a copy of RCC's IAP and displaying it would have been beneficial.
KPI 3.3.2 Decisions are communicated to key stakeholders in a timely manner in accordance with standard operating procedures		Some delays from task to action, however SOP's were followed and effective. Support agencies and resources were integrated – especially as the day progressed.	
Increase knowledge and understanding of roles and responsibilities within and across SAR agencies and support agencies.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
NO 5.0 - Situational awareness is established and maintained during the exercise	CO 5.1 Incident information is effectively managed and communicated by all agencies involved in the response	KPI 5.1.1 Accurate information is communicated within agencies (vertically) in a timely manner in accordance with standard operating procedures	Verbal communications and liaison were effective and appropriate to SOP's. Reconciliation numbers were aligned with Excon at end ex.
		KPI 5.1.2 Information is communicated between agencies (horizontally) in a timely manner in accordance with existing communications policies, procedures, and MOUs.	Cross agency authority powers could have been enhanced for Customs and Police. Health and St John coordinated with RCC and Airdesk. A Common operating system would obviously assist this.
		KPI 5.1.3 Information is appropriately stored.	Storage of info was in different agencies operating systems. Police – Riod, CD – Teams, St John/Health/Customs – internal.
		KPI 5.1.4 IT systems and processes are capable of sharing information in a timely manner.	As per 5.1.3, sharing across agencies was inhibited. Ongoing issue - Across NZ there are over 80 operating systems for emergency management recording/operating.
	CO 5.2 Response documentation is	KPI 5.2.1 Incident response documents (Action Plans, Situation Reports) are produced and	The written IAP aided collective situation awareness. Using maps early in the briefing would have been of

	correctly produced	disseminated accurately and in a timely manner to relevant stakeholders.	benefit to gain geographic context.
	CO 5.3 Information is communicated within and across agencies to support reconciliation	KPI 5.3.1 The information needs for reconciliation are identified.	Occurred, and was reconciled during briefings and informal sub group meetings.
		KPI 5.3.2 Information is obtained from appropriate source(s).	Well sourced from the shipping agent and from the ship itself. Health and Customs information disseminated quickly.
		KPI 5.3.3 Information is verified for accuracy.	Intell team were actively verifying. Health could have had more info on passenger status/movements.
		KPI 5.3.4 Appropriate actions are taken to protect data security, individuals' privacy and confidentiality.	Appropriate.
Increase knowledge and understanding of roles and responsibilities within and across SAR agencies and support agencies.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
NO 6.0 - Manage and deliver public information management to establish and maintain public assurance and confidence in the response	CO 6.1 Appropriate information processes and tools are used	KPI 6.1.1 Timely, accurate, and clear information is provided to stakeholders and target audiences.	PIM agency roles well understood; RCCNZ – rescue info, Police – land-based info. Communicated well.
		KPI 6.1.2 Messages align with strategic and operational objectives.	Appropriate and forwarded (diverted) to RCC or PNHQ as required.
		KPI 6.1.3 Proactive messaging across the full range of platforms fills the demand for information and shapes the conversation.	Not delivered in the IMT as referred back to the lead agency and support agency comms teams as appropriate
	CO 6.2 Coordinated and consistent public messaging is produced.	KPI 6.2.1 The PIM function is established and adopts an interagency approach.	Established and responsibility for 'lane' info identified and followed.
		KPI 6.2.2 The production and promulgation of public information is coordinated across agencies.	PIM messaging could have been shared across agencies for accuracy checking before dissemination.
	CO 6.3 Messaging aligns with and supports the operational response and key objectives.	KPI 6.3.1 Messages are validated against high level communications objectives and released in an appropriate and timely manner.	Information and channels were effectively managed during the exercise.

	CO 6.4 Timely and accurate information is delivered to those who need it.	KPI 6.4.2 Supporting agencies have a common understanding of the operational picture.	Early IAP and use of visual boards in the IMT assisted this, as did the regular briefings by the Response Manager and IC.
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Appendix B – Functional Teams Debrief Feedback

Sample of Hot Debrief Feedback – Functional Teams

Functional Team	Things Done Well	Areas For Improvement – not so well	To develop – what to do differently
Incident Controller	External agencies worked well together, overall result was really good, geographically challenging, only 3 persons outstanding, facility is amazing, stick to mission and intent.	Briefings – GSMEAC, maps to create situational awareness, how quickly each phase can get overwhelmed without the right taskings/people/resources.	Scribes, logging, prep for this, more staff.
Operations Manager	Structure up and running, good intent, key was 1 point of truth.	Everyone coming at you at once, normally other agencies getting taskings through their chain, stick to the CIMS model.	Nothing
Intelligence	-	Summary sitreps could be more formal.	-
Exercise Facilitator	Teams worked well, interagency neutral environment was excellent.	Be careful about the enviro stuff, outside the remit of RCC, media enquiries should go to RCC.	-
Investigation	Once understood how the ex was working, got into it, and felt it began to work well.	Didn't know coroner and customs was physically in the room, PLO didn't reply to requests sometimes, the first hour took a while to find 'my feet'.	Get a good briefing early – who's who, and who to talk to in the room.
Logistics	-	-	-
Safety and Planning	Did a lot in planning, learn risks early, got a good appreciation, bouncing between roles to help facilitate, rescue went well.	Develop key roles early – H&S prepares docs (with IC signing off).	-
PIM	-	-	-
Enviro Southland	Really good to support teams at Manapouri end.	Could have brought their team in to develop dashboard for reconciliation.	Keen to understand how the facility worked
FENZ	-	-	-
NZ Customs	Once they knew who was who, they could help more effectively.	Who's who would have been very helpful at the start.	-
Health	Highlighted how imp it was to be here, and help liaise with hospitals, got an early notification allowing hospitals to be on standby, early timing critical.	Took a while before the mass cas process was implemented, big learning was the importance of involvement of customs early, using predictive modelling to work out casualty rates/input to hospital.	-
Coroner	Good direct comms about deaths, and to see how the IMT worked -	-	-

	to help feed info.		
TAIC	Thanks for allowing us to observe, communications seemed very good – sticking to lane.	-	-
RCC	Really clear agency objectives, went over at each briefing – reducing duplication of effort.	Southland has a Mass casualty rescue plan – should have incorporated that into the functions, ex-con: RCC has ops systems that could help solve some of the IMT/comms friction – esp with Health/patients etc	Carry improvements through into the Wellington exercise.
Response Mgr	Good the briefings done, got systems up and running, went very well.	Needed to delegate out to key people earlier, delegate down as required, get more staff in earlier.	-
District Commander	Clear messaging, any questions- he knew the answer (IC), facility is amazing,	-	More police IT resource in the ECC for Police.
Police Observer	Went very well, IC briefings were detailed (because he had a great team), command and control well exercised, leadership (IC, response mgr) kept briefings low key (cascade effect of calmness), IAP was excellent and updated – very clear and detailed!! Good recon process, cadence of the day went to time and good use of the day.	Use GSMEAC, consider when search to be suspended, Stick to swim lanes (helos, boats, airfields, etc etc) not your responsibilities, Know powers of partners – e.g. Customs power to create a customs space, Room is really good, but functions didn't work at function sites/areas.	RCC vacuum, IT to help police work in their functional areas.
Ex-Con	Approx 70 injects (voice, emails), hopefully the injects helped play the exercise in a real way, having people in ex-con with good field experience and could play as per what would actually happen,	More role players in ex-con to match agencies in the room – e.g. St John, health.	-

Sample of Cold Debrief Feedback – All Agencies Involved (including Observers)

Agency	Things Done Well	What to do differently next time	Process Gaps – could add further value
RCCNZ	<p>At a national level for this incident there would be at least 10-12 LO's from various agencies in the RCC ops room for advice and liaison.</p> <p>This IMT ex validated the RCC desktop ex in Wellington.</p> <p>NOTAM in place was a good call.</p> <p>Handover discussion was excellent.</p>	<p>RCC IAP which was comprehensive with resources, contacts, planning, etc. This should have been projected onto the wall and left throughout the op. SITREPs as well – had been sent, but not seen as emails not checked throughout the ex.</p> <p>Should have had a live Teams format call so many people could listen in – would have assisted accuracy of info.</p> <p>Required more admin staff at RCC to help.</p> <p>Think about backfilling empty helo's travelling to the scene or IMT. Having a single contact point with IMT would be ideal.</p> <p>Log all actions so can be backchecked.</p>	<p>RCC IAP needs to be sent to 3-4 people (LO) who monitor comms and channels, so they can disseminate key info.</p> <p>SITREPS and IAP needs to delivered in a digestible format – that suit police.</p> <p>Taskings can be pushed through teams to assist capacity constraints.</p> <p>Record all teams meetings so incoming teams can gain sit awareness before arriving to assist in expediting integration.</p>
POLICE	<p>Communication went very well, how we got together, links to RCC and between Manapouri airport, took a while to work out what was required. Realistic scenario, pressure applied was very realistic. The finer details were excellent. First 6 hours is pulling all the info and getting out there sorting it.</p> <p>IC specifically asked district cmdr for removal of BAU responsibilities and delegate as required to allow focus on op (remember there would be multiple helos travelling down empty that could backfill with senior staff). IC also requested DVI support,</p> <p>Chief of staff role (to IC) was critical to assist the IC have the headspace to enact his plan.</p>	<p>Delegation – could have done this better, and delegated down to help things out. Need more admin staff, lots at leadership level, but more 'doers'. Should have done intros at the start and get to know who's who.</p> <p>Could have tightened the room up. Briefings – GSMEAC, could have been tighter, number of briefings – about right, but could have been less. More maps out-visual sit awareness, should have pushed for more info from the ground, Police team all at front – huddled, should have spread across the room, would have helped relationship building.</p>	<p>Customs involvement – police need to understand the powers and complexity involved.</p> <p>Thinking about process recording – e.g. for coronial requests, or other enquiries down the track. Producing a full risk analysis, Develop a plan to coord all documentation and requirements – esp T+48hrs. Planning function critical to the development of the op, where to put LO in support – paired up with Planning from district support.</p> <p>Setup a teams page early that can be used as source of truth and sharing.</p> <p>Record the initial briefing from RCC to MT IC, would have</p>

			been critical to go back and listen to details.
ST JOHN	Have good updates early on. Reached out across the org to replace/backfill team members (as per scenario plan), Ops lead was very accessible. Having FENZ manage LZ's was very helpful.	When requesting people to stay in their lanes, must also ask that if they see anything, say something and raise it as a concern in the IMT room. Should have stood up a district EOC in Dunedin. Should have got people in Deas Cove early to understand patient status and therefore pathway for right destination for each patient. Also could have had teams on the boats where possible.	IMT has no influence on airops – need to push back to RCC and airdesk who can coord any deconfliction of air assets. St John tactical planning and leadership should liaise with RCC to understand common terminology and capability (missing gap). Reminder St John is focused on treatment of patients, not ID of them.
HARBOUR MASTER	Excellent to see this exercise, 129 cruise ships through Fiordland, 3 areas. Highly likely there could be a response in the future.	Use the harbourmaster as local area resource and knowledge. Including how cruise ships operate.	Would be good to see the learning from this ex integrated into the local area review and updated plan. Would have been a long response – weeks, running the ship aground is a consideration rather than letting it sink in 300m of water.
FENZ	Did not attend debrief.	-	Need to understand the roles and capabilities of each agency represented.
CORONERS	Priority for the coroner is reported deaths – in this ex the total number came out quickly which helped scope potential. Accurate info of the 2 confirmed deaths. Really great to have the opportunity to observe. Good to see rumours (which there weren't any of) not driving decisions that weren't required.	One point of contact to manage any deaths is an important reminder. Future exercises – if more fatalities, then this would enact a much wider team response which would be good to exercise from a coronial aspect.	Reliance on police for definitive ID. Reminder coroner provides documents for repatriation. Their focus is cause of death and identification. Use MS Teams to document and share info and resources.
TAIC	Having ships agent involved was good to see. Very rewarding exercise and good to learn from as an agency.	Good at the initial briefing to clarify roles, but also abilities, which would assist other agencies understand capabilities.	TAIC needs to know who to be in contact with – as a follow up agency.
NZ CUSTOMS	Interagency coord and comms was very good and well run. Good hospitals were aware of the reconciliation process and	Could have offered a lot more if had known who everyone was, and agencies etc in the room. Passenger targeting system	Police need to understand Customs capability and powers of authority in such a situation.

	needing to have customs involved with patient tracking.	should have been enacted across the manifest, which would have involved a different approach with certain passengers. Police could have asked Customs to declare Manapouri Airport as a Customs exclusion zone.	Picture injects (at say Deep Cove) would have been a beneficial action to expedite processing. Can then marry up with biometric info from earlier in the day. Consider where any deceased would go and how they would need to be processed.
CDEM	Facility worked really well. Interagency cooperation and integration worked well with facility layout.	Over 250 staff trained in CIMS, and loads of admin staff available, use them and ask. Lots of police leadership in 1 st shift, would have been overwhelmed if went on for a long time.	Intell hard to contact, had to go via planning. Use CDEM for local contacts and extensive info – council, infrastructure companies, telcos, airports, community groups. Use the GIS capability of councils to assist – movement of vessels, aircraft.
HOSPITAL	Really enjoyed being part of the exercise. Good to integrate and find out how to work with other agencies.	Info flow to hospitals is very critical to ensure hospitals can pre prepare resources and staffing.	Understanding the limitations of Health resources locally, so knowing what to request wider afield.
IWI/HAPU	Did not attend exercise	-	-
DoC	Did not attend exercise	-	DoC staff know the terrain and locations well – use as required.
NZDF	Did not attend exercise	-	-
PHHQ	Looked calm and controlled. Well done.	Don't use IC email address as the conduit address.	Need to socialise what PNHQ's capabilities are for input.
NZSAR/Excon			Need to create a reconciliation process map to take away and share that others can use. Take the ex's learnings and weave into response plans. Plan for a large number of people and how to process them all – e.g. transport and customs/immigration.

Appendix C - Timeline of Exercise Events

Time	Action
0700	ExCon Activates
0725/0747/0755	Exercise commences – initial PANPAN at 0725, decision to abandon ship at 0747: call to RCCNZ, who then calls local SAR coordinator at 0755
0800	Police area commander notified
0810	RCCNZ briefing and SITREP (including IAP)
0820	IC briefing - Exercise briefing, intent, initial tasks and scenario provided
0910	Support agencies briefing by IC and Response Manager
0930/1030/1100/ 1230/1400	IMT Team briefings, Response Manager led with input from all key functional areas, and a summary by the IC with focal actions
0845	Police on site at Te Anau Manapouri Airport
0950	'MNZ Press Release
1010	News of Chinese Ambassador on the ship
1012	CCP requests for support
1030	RCC SITREP
1100	Interview + media requests
1145	CCP requests for support
1211	Last of crew abandon ship
1215	RCC SITREP
1230	MFAT requests assistance
1230	NOTAM issued
1241	Briefing request for Police commissioner
1330	SITREP to Deputy Commissioner operations
1340	All staff in the field reconciled
1357	Iwi requests for information
1415	RCC SITREP, prep for shift handover to incoming IC – full team briefing
1530	District commander briefing – IC handover
1540	End ex called
1545	Hot Debrief conducted
1630	Hot debrief concludes, end of day
0900 D+1	Following day (Friday) - Cold Debrief
1145 D+1	Cold debrief concludes. All agencies' personnel depart

Appendix D – Evidence of IMT in Action

NEW ZEALAND POLICE High Performance & Accountability

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

*** EXECUTION - 3 PHASES**

- 1- RESPONSE
- 2- RESCUE
- 3- REPATRIATION

ACTION PLAN (AP)

Incident Type / Generation: **OP THOMPSON** Date/Time: **7/12/23 - 1030**

LOCATION (GROUND): **THOMPSON SOUND - FIORDLAND**

SITUATION SUMMARY: **RCCNZ HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SILVER SEE'S PACIFIC II, WHO HAVE REPORTED A LOSS OF POWER & STEERING, HAVE STRUCK ROCKS AND ARE 'SINKING'. THERE ARE 256 SOULS ON BOARD AND ARE ABANDONING SHIP - WEATHER IS DETERIORATING.**

ACTION PLAN OBJECTIVES (MISSION): **TO SUPPORT RCCNZ AS LEAD AGENCY TO RESCUE AND REPATRIATE ALL SOULS ON BOARD**


<p>EXECUTION (How will we achieve the objective):</p> <p>General Outline: COMO INTENT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MULTI AGENCY APPROACH, POLICE LEAD TO SUPPORT RCC - RECONCILIATION IS ACHIEVED IN A TIMELY, ROBUST AND ACCURATE PROCESS 	<p>TASKINGS:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GRIFFITHS SAR TO DEPLOY DEEP COVE WITH TEAM OF 3 - GRAHAM - DEPLOY TO MANAPOURI / FC - HENDERSON TO DEE'S COVE - HOLLEBON TO DEEP COVE - LOGISTICS TO ESTB BUSES IN AREA - INTRILL TO CONTACT RCC ABOUT VESSELS OF OPPORTUNITY 	<p>COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DEPLOY NOW - SAR - ST JOHNS TO DEPLOY FORWARD TO DEEP COVE & DEAS
<p>ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SAR - DEPLOY WITH KIT - ALL STAFF FORWARD 12 HRS - CDEM WELFARE TO SET UP COMMUNITY TEAM IN MANAPOURI 	<p>COMMAND & SIGNALS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - LOW LOCAL CONTROLLER - BOWMAN INCIDENT CONTROLLER - HARVEY ZIC / CHIEF OF STAFF 	

AP valid to: _____ AP approved by (Incident Controller): _____ Risk assessment completed / reference: _____

Date / time of approval: _____

*** ALL AGENCIES TO DEPLOY IN A MANNER COMMENSURATE WITH THEIR ROLE AND PURPOSE**

IMT IAP as at 1030hrs.



IMT listening to a media report.



Support agencies in action.



Additional media report being analysed.



Functional team leads briefed by the Response Manager.

STAFF IN FIELD AS OF 7/12 1307 OP THOMPSON

POLICE x 7
 POLICE SAR - DEEP COVE TL +3
 DEEP COVE TL +3 } 15 DEPLOYED

HEALTH - 1 GP AT MANAPOURI AP
 1 ENROUTE 5 HOURS AWAY

FENZ - 4 LZ & MANAPOURI AP
 - 32 B PER SITE } 32 DEPLOYED
 - 1 GROUND AC / SPT } 4 STAND BY
 - 1 DEAS COVE

ST JOANS - 33 STAFF DEPLOYED

CDEM WELFARE - 1 MANAPOURI AIRCRAFT
 10 COMMUNITY RESPONSE

CUSTOMS - 4 STAFF MANAPOURI

95 DEPLOYED

Reconciling staff in the field.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

*** EXECUTION - 3 PHASES**

- 1- RESPONSE
- 2- RESCUE
- 3- REPATRIATION

ACTION PLAN (AP)

Incident Type / Operation: **OP THOMPSON** Date/Time: **7/12/23 1300**

LOCATION / GROUND: **THOMPSON SOUND - FIJIDLAND**

SITUATION SUMMARY: **2 DECEASED AT DEAS COVE, CHINESE AMBASSADOR ON BOARD, CHINESE EMBASSY SENDONG HELICOPTER TO DEEP COVE. OTHER EMBASSY'S ENROUTE TO TE ANAU, RESCUE OF PASSENGERS ON GOING. EVALUATION CENTRE IN PROCESS OF SETTING UP**

ACTION PLAN OBJECTIVES (MISSION): **TO SUPPORT RCNZ AS LEAD AGENCY TO RESCUE AND REPATRIATE ALL SOULS ON BOARD**

EXECUTION (How will we achieve the objective):

General Outline: **COMO INTENT**

- MULTI AGENCY APPROACH, POLICE LEAD TO SUPPORT REC

- RECONCILIATION IS ACHIEVED IN A TIMELY, ROBUST AND AGILE PROCESS

TASKS:

- CUSTOMS OPS TO ORGANISE WITH SHIPPING COMPANY FOR AERON
- OPS TO ADVISE ONE SQUAD
- CORONER INFORMED
- REC TASKING UPLIFT OF DECEASED
- CDEM WELFARE & RECROSS SQUAD WELFARE CENTRES
- INT ADVISED - DISTRICT COMMAND

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

TIMINGS ON GOING

- PLANNING CONTINGUAL CONTACT WITH REC
- ★ LOGISTICS TO LIASE WITH OEFM NEXT 12-24 HRS

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

- SAR DEPLOY WITH KIT
- ALL STAFF FORWARD 12 HR'S
- CDEM WELFARE TO SET UP COMMUNITY TEAM IN MANAPOURI

COMMAND & SIGNALS


- LOW LOCAL CONTROLLER
- BOWMAN INCIDENT CONTROLLER
- HARVEY ZIC / CHIEF OF STAFF

AP valid to: _____ AP approved by (Incident Controller): _____ Risk assessment completed / reference: _____

Date / time of approval: _____


★ ALL AGENCIES TO DEPLOY IN A MANNER COMMENSURATE WITH THEIR ROLE AND PURPOSE

Revised IAP as at 1300hrs.



Ex-con inject and storyboard schematic.

Appendix E – Exercise Incident Location



Exercise incident location and surface transport route and timings.


Grounding and Mayday

- 0725 – approaching Thompson Sound
- Loss of steering control
- ~0730 - scrapes hull
- 0747 - decision to abandon ship




Exercise incident initial timings.

Exercise Control



Excon Structure

Exercise Control



Concept of Excon relationship to Players

Appendix G - Risk Register

ID	Owner	Risk description	Inherent risk			Risk treatment / updates	Residual risk		
			Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level		Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level
1	Excon	Conflict with actual incident. An actual incident occurs on the day that takes priority over the exercise.	Possible	Major	High	Assess situation to determine if exercise can continue. If several key players are called away, consider continuing the exercise as a reduced tabletop/discussion session. If exercise must be stopped, an alternate date will be considered to re-run the session.	Possible	Moderate	Medium
2	Excon	Playing agency withdraws on the day having originally committed.	Possible	Major	High	Review impact on exercise play. Substitute Excon role-players to fill the roles of missing players if expertise allows. Scale back exercise to discussion around the missing players roles. If impact is considerable, postpone exercise.	Possible	Moderate	Medium
3	Excon Host Agencies	Health & Safety – mostly standard office-based risks. Some lifting related risks due to	Possible	Major	High	Cords and wires to be taped down Signs placed on frequently opened doors Walkways and emergency exits kept clear	Possible	Moderate	Medium

ID	Owner	Risk description	Inherent risk			Risk treatment / updates	Residual risk		
			Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level		Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level
		equipment set up.			High	All participants briefed on emergency provisions for buildings – exits, firefighting, first aid, defibs Lifting/moving of items to be undertaken with good form. Heavy loads – use multiple people and/or trolleys			High
5	Excon Agencies	Vehicle accident. Personnel participating in exercise involved in a vehicle accident	Possible	Moderate	Medium	Safety briefings for any significant vehicle movements. Ensure all participants follow the fatigue guidelines Licenced drivers only to operate vehicles. All road rules to be followed.	Possible	Moderate	Medium
7	Excon	Misunderstanding resulting in perception that exercise is not an exercise but is a real event creating community concerns and/or agency responses.	Possible	Major	High	Communications managed against Exercise communications plan. All messages contain “exercise only” stamps. Police Comms Centre and RCCNZ, and Police Media team to be notified of the exercise. Notify all support agencies of	Possible	Moderate	Medium

ID	Owner	Risk description	Inherent risk			Risk treatment / updates	Residual risk		
			Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level		Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level
						exercise dates and scenarios.			
8		Emergency or on-site incident leading to evacuation of exercise facilities	Low	Major		Safety and evacuation briefings to be provided to all participants. A real and significant incident will requires a postponement of the exercise (see risk #1). In the event of a false alarm or minor incident at a single exercise site the exercise will be paused. The incident be assessed to determine if the exercise is resumed (with or without re-entry to the building), postponed.	Low	Major	
9		Illness/injury to Exxon or evaluator staff leaving them unable to participate on the day	Low	Major		All Exxon staff to be briefed on performing multiple roles. Documentation for exercise prepared in advance and saved in a centralised document management system accessible to all Exxon staff. Alternate evaluators	Low	Moderate	

ID	Owner	Risk description	Inherent risk			Risk treatment / updates	Residual risk		
			Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level		Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level
						identified to be brought in to cover for any absenteeism.			
10		ICT failure leading to inability to pass injects or other control messages between Exxon and players.	Possible	Major		Hard copy contact lists to be maintained and distributed. Use of multiple mobile phones within Exxon. Test run of system access, email and other messaging to be performed prior to the exercise day. Hard copy injects to be held for manual delivery to players in case of email outage. Failure of player ICT systems to be played as part of exercise.	Low	Major	